2016-02-24

Where the “Good Guys” get their motivation from


A Syrian refugee boy stands behind the fence during a protest against Syria's President Bashar al-Assad at Yayladagi refugee camp in Hatay province on the Turkish-Syrian border March 30, 2012
 The conflict in Syria is portrayed  in most media presentations as one of “Two evils and no good guys”. Discussion seems to boil down to choosing the “lesser” of these two evils, even though it all started as a peaceful uprising three years ago. Forms of civil disobedience do persist in and outside Syria. This multifaceted resistance against the Syrian regime appears to be naturally developing, adapting, and changing – on an individual as well as on an organized level. My aim was to question the reasons for the perseverance of the nonviolent movement and Syrian civil activism more broadly. Is peaceful engagement gaining new momentum? What potential has it created? Being the foundation of a civil society in and after an ongoing civil war, the phenomenon deserves attention.

I conducted in-depth but also informal interviews with activists from different backgrounds.[1] We discussed peaceful activism in the Syrian context and reflected on how the events of the past three years have shaped and altered civil resistance. Although not all of these individuals’ motivation and experiences are given credit to in this article, their insights and thoughts shaped my perception of this dynamic movement. I conclude that – intentionally or unconsciously – some of the young Syrians living in exile distance themselves from any form of political engagement and thereby from the events inside Syria. The most urgent task of the activists inside Syria is to provide access to basic humanitarian goods, whereas Syrians living in exile to a greater extent realize their potential in the cultural sphere. The nonviolent movement has become more of an observer to politics than taking part in it; partly haunted by a feeling of being isolated from dissidents and activists inside Syria, partly also not recognized as equal partners for those inside any longer. One side effect is apparently the creation and utilization of a space for civil activism Syrians had no access to in a state silenced by an all-embracing “graveyard peace”.

Shattering the “Peace of the Graveyard”

Until 2011, even activities like launching an independent initiative to clean the street in Syria could have resulted in being arrested. All social and political activism was grouped under government financed “non-governmental” organizations and run by relatives of regime members – the best-known example being the “Syria Trust for Development”, chaired and founded by Asma Al Assad. The message to independent civil society activists being that their efforts are dispensable in light of already existing administrative structures. A period of political opening after the passing of Hafez al-Assad’s presidency to his son Bashar, from 2000 to 2001, known as “Damascus Spring”, turned out as a mere façade for the regime to collect information and to keep control over political activists. Ultimately, more than four decades of Ba’ath party rule had created an environment that is best described with the metaphor of “the peace of a graveyard” – an atmosphere of silence and oppression that had left its marks on the evolving civil movement. One consequence is that civil activists today ensure that they are acting independently of any politician or organization that might try to “pull their strings”. In the beginning, they were looking for any support from outside, but with time they became more aware that external support also might amount to certain “strings attached” that were not in line with their ideas.

In 2011, the onset of the revolutoin set the stage for the ordinary Syrian citizen to become politically active in one way or another. Whereas some preferred the relative safety of their friends’ homes for cautious discussions about the events on the streets, others decided to join the protests – now deliberately exposing themselves to the danger of being detained or killed. Some of the more traditional opposition who had been politically active in the underground for many years benefitted from the newly emerging scope for political freedoms. However, essentially the revolution was carried and advanced by citizens who had not been politically active ever before, citizens who sensed that just now the time had come to engage in more organized forms of civil activism. During this initial phase of civil unrest, there was no obvious division between civil and political activism and the diversity and looseness of first political networks made the movement less susceptible to destruction by the regime. Consequently, the landscape of peaceful protest was as ambiguous as were the judgments of the Syrian people about what might happen next, and although a hitherto blank page was filled with visions about democracy, structures of surveillance and repression worked as an eraser on such early sketches. Whatever society could flourish against such a starting point, as the following observations demonstrate, is nothing like a “textbook-civil society” in terms of institutionalization.

The rise and fall of the first wave of civil activism

The arrest of a group of teenagers in Dara’a – the town that would later be referred to as the cradle of the Syrian uprising – had triggered landslide protests in 2011. However, the rural population was already marginalized by four years of drought and suffered from earlier policies of economic liberalization which had ultimately translated into an ever growing gap between rich and poor. It was therefore rather the marginalized regions of Syria who sparked the uprising – areas such as Deir ez-Zor or Hassakeh rather than Dara'a, a comparatively advantaged stronghold of the Baath party, who found themselves disconnected from the large centres and excluded from the prosperity they themselves had produced as the “breadbaskets of Syria”. Besides, the dissident members of the small cultural circles in the “intellectual centres” of Aleppo and Damascus were rather hesitant in the meantime.

One matter is however evident: in 2011, there were many different, but many feasible reasons all over Syria to upraise. Although the revolution started in different places in reaction to different problem situations and across political and social classes, the common experience of violent repression provided a fertile soil for alliances beyond social, cultural or religious borders at that time. Yet the main visionaries of the peaceful movement visible to the world public today are Syrians stemming from a well-educated middle class. While some of them stress that there is a visible network between all levels of activism, others criticize that there is rarely any connection left between exiled activists and the grass root movement. However, what is visible to the more attentive observer are the voices from places such as Kafranbel or Saraqeb. Both towns belong to the Idlib Governorate, whose inhabitants are not exactly part of what is commonly referred to as “a well-educated middle-class”, but nonetheless attracted international attention with witty posters and banners and writings on walls respectively. In short, the voices of the revolution remain heterogeneous. This should be kept in mind in light of fact that the following remarks focus on a patchwork of young activists who are mostly based abroad and stem from an academic background.

In any case, networks between the different revolutionary groups are only feasible in view of the fact that from the beginning activists had utilized international media platforms such as Youtube or Facebook, thereby creating a unique global setup of peaceful resistance. The movement is highly reliant on these bonds, as today a significant share of it is operated from abroad. This not only includes Syria’s neighbouring countries as Lebanon or Turkey, but also the European Union and the United States. Bisher Alissa, executive coordinator of the Syrian Non Violence Movement (SNVM), living in California, emphasizes that it was his very absence from Syria that enabled him to increase his activism. “It’s not that romantic being a revolutionary in Damascus in 2012. Your mobile phone is dead, your internet is watched, and you can be detained at any moment. This doesn’t allow for a very healthy environment when trying to build up an organization.” Rola*, who works in complementing the memory of the Syrian revolution by documenting peaceful campaigns for Syria Untold, additionally notes that it was important for the activists in 2011 to realize that global media platforms had the power to cover human rights violations committed by the regime. However, the young Syrian demonstrators found themselves excluded from the associated debates. They were confronted with the doubts of the international community as to the validity of the sheer mass of material they had collected. Apparently, the Syrian regime successfully incorporated its own narrative in international media representations – a narrative about jihadist groups striving for influence within Syria, while discrediting the opposition as ‘terrorists’. With the international focus gradually shifting from condemning the Syrian regime, the social and political dimension to the Syrian mobilization was undermined. This widely destroyed the activist’s hopes of being noticed by the international community and left a bitter aftertaste in the mouths of those who were struggling to define a creative space for their own initiatives.

General Failure, Individual Success: The Re-Shaping of the Non-Violent Movement

One side effect being that in 2011, step by step, the situation developed into an armed resistance, as defected soldiers and officers joined forces to establish the Free Syrian Army and Syrian citizens would take up arms to defend themselves. Mustafa Haid, founder of the Syrian NGO Dawlaty, explains how in his opinion the decision to carry weapons is strongly related to the capacity of the human mind. Taking reasonable action might be easy in a normal environment, as he reflects, but facing a civil war and the destruction of one’s home and family, the capacity to cope with losses might diminish. The resorting to use force to protect oneself might appear the only option left. Haid also points out that the nonviolent movement made a mistake when opposing the armed resistance instead of cooperating with armed groups, which further diminished the already limited capacities of the nonviolent activists. Ali, an activist based in a small village in Idlib to the present day, says that, “as much as I believed in peaceful resistance before, eventually I had to carry a weapon after having realized that otherwise the regime will not fall”. Ali is grounding his resistance on his belief in God – the “Islamic Front” has a strong presence in Idlib – yet he rejects the “Islamic State” (IS) for the fact that as foreigners to the Syrian society he deems the IS not capable of defending the interests of the Syrian people. His case illustrates how the realities of Syrians living abroad and of those based inside Syria are drifting apart. The Syrians who mostly live in relatively secure conditions and profit from international funding create an unprecedented domain for civil activism that appears detached from the realities of a civil war.

Two basic entities represent the Syrian nonviolent opposition in terms of institutionalization. On the grass-root level, the “Local Coordination Committees” were initially helpful to connect the peaceful movement throughout the country. However, they stopped working in an efficient way, not least due to the lack of resources, the kidnapping, arrest and assassination of their most important figures, as well as the fact that they were gradually overrun by armed forces. However, alongside with the above-mentioned town of Kafranbel, the city of Daraya marks an exception to this phenomenon. The nonviolent resistance to a certain extent managed to peacefully coexist with the armed movement because the fighters were from the region – they did not allow any outsider in, which granted an organic relationship of armed actors to their environment. On the international level, neither the “National Coalition”[2] and the affiliated “Interim Government”, nor the “National Council” was able to spread its message to the streets and unify the grassroots movement. The National Council had been seen critically by many people already. Accordingly, National Council member Husam Al Katlaby, not active any more to the present day, finds harsh words to describe his experience, stating that the Council’s members were too inflexible in their thinking and completely at odds with each other. The National Coalition, founded in 2012 in Doha, gave the impression of being “the same under a new label”, and its inauguration with US support in Qatar also caused many doubts about how authentically it could represent Syrian interests.

As one side-effect of the high level of violence in Syria and the distrust against the institutionalized opposition, the interviewees see a risk in the fact that many Syrians are starting to (re-)turn to religious affiliation as the main means of identification. The media activist Ayman* suggests that the civil war led to a revelation of reactionary claims out of fear and a search for spiritual guidance. Ayman* is himself an example for how dangerous extremist groups can become, even for long standing civil activism. As an atheist stemming from a Christian/Druze background, today active as a film maker, he indicates to have lost the feeling for what is valuable for his society: “I know that I don’t want an Islamic state. But if you ask me why? … I do want to drink and all that, but is it really the best for society?” Reflecting on his own words and on the “Islamic State’s” increasingly professionalized media appearances, he carves out where the actual danger of the IS lies: “They are showing some flexibility for change – and that is the scary thing.” The writer Khaled El-Ekhetyar remembers an encounter with a secular person in Syria, “who grew himself a beard and went to the prayers with religious armed rebels, while hiding Arak behind a tree in the garden”, for the reason that the armed divisions had the guns he needed to defend his family. Although he sarcastically states that “maybe this is not an example for everybody at that time right now”, it exemplifies the complex fragmentation of the grassroots movement inside Syria beyond religious affiliation.

The impression prevails among Syrians living in exile that due to the high level of violence, the irrelevance of the institutionalized opposition and the rise of sectarian tensions the revolution has failed on the general level. On an individual basis, however, most interviewed persons see themselves as activists who have succeeded in growing up as revolutionaries and now aim at some kind of a cultural revolution.

Resistance against all odds

In late 2014, searching for the revolution – inside and outside Syria – and celebrating its uniqueness, while at the same time being part of the healing of those wounds the regime’s brutal reaction to their legitimate claims caused, is what in the eyes of many activists stands for “resistance against all odds”. 

“I must look out for my revolution. It is still there.” When it comes to the first-mentioned mantra, Mustafa Haid draws on his experience when meeting activists in Syria. For him, the most important task is to travel back to see what is happening on the ground. He asserts that even experienced activists are susceptible to being tricked by media representations: “When I go to visit different villages, I am subjected to the typical bias of where nonviolent activism should be. Sometimes this is totally wrong.” However, considering the extent to which peaceful revolutionary structures were gradually marginalized in the course of the past three years, the often-quoted outcry of some activists that their revolution was “kidnapped”, seems understandable. “Who is a revolution being stolen from? Maybe you are just not good enough to have your own revolution”, is the answer Khaled El-Ekhetyar finds.

Whereas the media is quick to lump together the uprisings in the “Arab World”, Syrian activists usually don’t see themselves as guided by what became known as the “Arab Spring”. The evolving Syrian civil society landscape indeed seems exceptional. Although the scope of peaceful activism within Syria is weakened on a daily basis, the peaceful movement connects activists inside Syria with those operating from abroad. Whereas the former group provides information about the situation on the ground, the latter works to increase the visibility of the non-violent movement on an international level by networking. The Damascene journalist Maurice Aaek stresses that it is especially this increase in capacity that the activists need, although he admits that the civil society based outside suffers from the lack of knowledge about activities on the ground. Sara*, a Syrian journalist who recently left Damascus, claims that there is no such thing as nonviolent activism in Syria any more: “Those who talk about it have obviously not been there for a while. Now it is impossible to do anything”. However, she admits that she has no detailed information about the countryside and other towns and cities, as the scope of the activism inside Syria naturally varies across different regions. Rola* explains where such impressions come from. “We work anonymously; even most of my friends don’t know I am working with Syria Untold.” Although she lives inside Syria, Rola* interviews people mostly via Skype, and when documenting campaigns in some cases the organization does not publish the actual location. Like Mustafa Haid, she underlines that although IS poses a great danger, there are still various forms of civil disobedience even in places where no kind of activism would have been expected. She refers to a campaign in Raqqa that became famous as “Raqqa is being slaughtered silently” as well as to smaller, unorganized protests she herself witnessed. Rola* is sure that relying on such unrelenting initiatives is the most important motivation for Syrian activists. Husam Al Katlaby, program officer at the Syrian Justice and Accountability Center (SJAC), based in the Netherlands, notes that NGOs which document human rights violations are highly dependent on their contacts inside Syria – in the case of the SJAC currently around eight people. Some organizations focus particularly on a global audience. The most prominent example being the above-mentioned Syrian Non Violence Movement, which has received much international attention for its unprecedented effort to produce a remarkable visual map of nonviolent activism in Syria. The main motivation behind this mapping is to reach out to the international media to demonstrate the dimension of the Syrian civil society by visualizing its connections, as Bisher Alissa, executive director of the SNVM, explains. “The map was done to show the world that we exist, and we exist as a big force.” Shadi Azzam, director of NUON, a Syrian NGO located in Beirut that concentrates on peace-building and reconciliation, expresses his understanding that civil society is ideally concerned with every single Syrian citizen, no matter whether he supports or tries to overthrow the regime. Such visions exemplify the extent to which principles like “reconciliation” or “transitional justice” are susceptible to being used as something of a ready-made template for civil resistance, being more of a commonplace than filled with content. Reflecting on his experience with the Day After Project, a project launched in 2012 to support a future democratic transition in Syria, Husam Alkatlaby is however sure that the concrete outcomes of such initiatives will be of great value for transitional processes.

Many Syrians increasingly put emphasis on finding solutions to concrete drawbacks brought about as a consequence of the civil war. Such shortcomings could as well be referred to as “teething problems” of the nonviolent movement. As Mustafa Haid explains: “On one side we are struggling to achieve what we wanted from the beginning. On the other side we are a part of the healing from what happened.” Khaled El-Ekhetyar, for instance, works on launching a webpage for Syrian refugees to access information about their legal status in Lebanon. His goal is to support the refugees assert their rights through knowing their duties. The media activist Ayman* focusses on the shortcomings of the unexperienced peaceful movement by pursuing a research about youth access to multimedia. He aims at arriving at a better understanding as regards the target audience of the creative media initiative Waw al Wasel, which he co-founded. The group applies creative techniques to produce video art with the aim of building alternative media free from ideological influences.

Rola* sometimes struggles with the agenda of certain groups when documenting initiatives for Syria Untold. She gives the example of one campaign whose members claimed that only God could help them, since only Islam will destroy their enemy, Assad. “They felt left behind by those who asked for freedom and dignity at the beginning of the revolution”, Rola* says. The young archaeologist Ahmad* is yet another example. He supports the revolution, even though in his opinion it is the ultimate reason for the suffering Syria is witnessing now: “All of us are working to resolve our revolutionary problems, but who is working for the success of the revolution? Maybe, only the regime is still working – to kill the revolution.” Not considering himself an “activist”, Ahmad* refers to one initiative he is working with, which, as he explains, researches and documents the destruction of Syrian’s ancient sites – committed from both pro- and anti-regime forces. One interesting capability of such campaigns is that they are installed by individuals who do not consider themselves to be “activists”, but still feel the need to engage in some kind of activism with the purpose of contributing to healing the revolution’s wounds. Such initiatives embrace both people who are with as well as people who are against the regime – a first step of reconciliation. This potential scope for cooperation beyond deadlocked political mind-sets complements the bandwidth of peaceful resistance. However, together with his colleagues Ahmad* decided that the name of their small organization should not be published yet. This suggests the sensitivity of cooperation efforts between supporters and opponents of the regime, as well as it unveils one difference between Syrian activists in a more “classical sense”, and the “average” citizen. But although being more careful when it comes to the publishing of details related to their efforts, the way how those individuals are making use of a kind of freedom that was before silenced by a graveyard peace, might be one of the most overlooked feature and potential of the peaceful movement.

Future Visions: A Flourishing Civil Society and a Failing State?

Many activists show a high level of pessimism – responding with a grim outlook to the frequently asked question about Syria’s future. The imperative to continue with the revolution on the one hand and the need to find solutions to the immediate suffering of many Syrians as a consequence of the regime’s answer to their claims on the other hand created a feeling of fighting on two fronts. Those active in the nonviolent movement are however convinced about its sustainability, whereas the impatience to arrive at something like a democratic state disappeared. The chief editor of Syria Untold is sure that in the next – five to twenty-five – years a new generation of civil resistance will emerge as a foundation for a future civil society. But how do the young activists envisage a future Syria? “I think it will stay within the same geographical borders” – Ahmad’s* ironic assessment seems all the more cynical considering the rise of the “Islamic State”. More thoughtfully, however, he shares his opinion about the whereabouts of the Syrian regime in five years. “Some of them, imprisoned. Some of them, in high political positions. Some of them, killed. But maybe, most of them will stay.” Nibal*, an activist working on peacebuilding for NUON, emphasizes the importance of transforming the mentality of the army, which in her opinion can only be achieved by separating the army from the regime. Bisher Alissa finds the answer to such worries in processes of reconciliation: “We have other examples to rely on. Look at Nelson Mandela”.

In the end, the activists’ positions remain imprecise. They design a realm of civil activism that is detached from the civil war – and from politics more generally. However, as indicated above, the most influential potential of civil activism might well be that it creates a cultural sphere which the Syrian civil society has been denied by the Ba’ath regime for four decades. Maybe, a “natural selection process”[3] was necessary to produce a more confident and sustainable resistance movement. “For those who fell on the way, maybe it had to be like that”, Alissa says, “we can’t help but be optimistic and keep on pushing forward with our vision.”

Conclusion

The individual insights remind us that this conflict is neither to be presented as a choice to be made between the lesser of two evils being Assad and the “Islamic State”, nor as a scenario with only armed groups involved. Instead, it prompts us with the multifaceted Syrian mentalities within the realm of peaceful resistance and traces the effects of a three year civil war that brought about the displacement of nine million Syrian people on the psychology of individuals and on an evolving civil society. It appears all the more encouraging that a large number of activists continue to create a panorama of unique peaceful activism. At times expressing the feeling of being fence sitters while the Syrian state is on the verge of failing, those activists are in the position to “practice civil society”. Although for the time being they are restricted to thought experiments as to their impact in a future Syria, the non-violent movement already fulfils a range of functions indispensable for a civil society.

In the Syrian context, it is perceived as a matter of course to be an “activist”. Motivation and future remain unarticulated. In the end, the “Good Guys” refuse to involve themselves in politics. The political becomes an object of observation rather than subject of engagement. Such processes of de-politicization are as unpleasant as they seem inevitable. They provide the activists with a space they were unable to obtain under Assad – as well as apparently unable to find within the political realm after the onset of the revolt in 2011. No matter what happens, we need to keep on going – so the reasoning goes, and as nobody could predict what would happen in Syria, nobody can foresee where this path will lead.

 “They said; because of dictatorship, because of Islam, because of poverty, because of Islamophobia, because of reconciliation, because of globalization, because of ... Mother Theresa … – nothing will change in the Middle East. And because of the reasons mentioned, everything has changed in the Middle East.”[4]

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* Name changed.

[1] The article does not address the Istanbul-based “Syrian National Coalition”, but rather illuminates civil society structures, which evolved in parallel to institutionalized forms of political opposition.

[2] The “National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Force” is an alliance of opposition groups formed in November 2012 in Doha. It is not to be confused with the Istanbul-based “National Council” that was founded in August 2011.

[3] Interview Khaled El-Ekhetyar, 25.06.2014, Beirut.

[4] Interview Khaled El-Ekhetyar, 25.06.2014, Beirut.

2016-01-07

اللاجئون السوريون في لبنان



Status: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon







حوار أجراه عمر ضاحي  مع خالد الاختيار

صاغه باللغة العربية الفصحى أسامة إسبر




الوضع Status: هل يمكنك أن تقدم لنا لمحة سريعة عن أوضاع اللاجئين السوريين في لبنان وعن التغيرات التي تحدث في أوضاعهم وعن القوانين التي تتعلق باللاجئين في الفترة الأخيرة وخاصة في الأشهر الستة الأخيرة؟



خ: لا أعرف كم يمكن أن توصل هذه اللمحة فكرتي. إن القسم الأكبر من اللاجئين السوريين موجود في لبنان في هذه الفترة، ولقد أحضر اللاجئون مشاكلهم معهم، وبالإضافة إلى هذه المشاكل اضطروا إلى استيراد كل مشاكل لبنان، وهم عملياً يعانون من عبئين بدلاً من عبء واحد، فهناك عبء التأقلم مع البيئة المحلية هنا، وهذه البيئة غريبة على جزء كبير منهم، وهناك المفاجأة والمشاكل التي حدثت في سوريا بعد أن عسكرة الثورة

لقد مر اللاجئون هنا في مراحل كثيرة. كانت المرحلة الأولى هي مرحلة موقف الحكومة اللبنانية التي فوجئت بوجود لاجئين، فقد سموهم زواراً وضيوفاً وغيرها من التعابير المطاطة التي لا تحمّل الحكومة أعباء قانونية أو أخلاقية، ثم استيقظوا فجأة واكتشفوا أن هناك أزمة، وسموها الأزمة السورية، أو أزمة اللاجئين، ثم بدأت أسئلة من نوع: ماذا نفعل؟ وكانت هناك ردات فعل من المجتمع الأهلي واللبناني أهم بكثير من رد فعل الحكومة اللبنانية، لكن وكما يقول المثل: إن يداً واحدة لا تصفّق، خاصة حين تكون هناك سياسة إنكار للمشكلة بسبب الأوضاع السياسية والترتيبات السياسية بين النظامين، نظام لبنان إذا كانت تصح تسميته نظاماً والنظام في سوريا، مما منع الحكومة اللبنانية من أن تتخذ خطوات حقيقية وتعترف بالمشكلة وأسبابها وتعثر لها على حلول من خلال التعاون مع أطراف داخلية وخارجية، و مع اللاجئين أنفسهم. استغرقت هذه المسألة وقتاً طويلاً إلى أن توافقوا على الاعتراف بأن هناك مشكلة أساسية يجب أن نحلها الآن بمعزل عن علاقتنا مع النظام أو في الحد الأدنى، لا نريد أن نزعجهم كثيراً لكن في الوقت نفسه لا نريد أن نكون مرتهنين ١٠٠٪ لرأي النظام السوري حيال موضوع اللاجئين كونه يعتبرهم فارين من العدالة وإرهابيين وأن مجيئهم مؤقت والوضع في سوريا متحسن ويفضل ألا يكون هناك هذه النسبة الكبيرة كي يظهر أن الأمور هي بخير في سوريا. بعد هذا القصة بدأت الحكومة اللبنانية مؤخراً تناشد أطرافاً دولية وبدأت الوزارات تتحرك بصيغ ما وحدود ما كي تحتوي هذه المشكلة لكن هناك دوماً هذه الصيغة وهي أنه لا قدرة للبنان على تحمل هذا العبء، وآخر ما توصلوا إليه الآن هو قرارهم المباشر وغير المباشر بإغلاق الحدود، ووضعت قوانين واتخذت إجراءات للحد من دخول السوريين إلى لبنان وهذا ما شاهدناه مؤخراً في ظل القوانين التي صدرت في الفترة الأخيرة

لكن الأزمة مستمرة وأعتقد أنها تتفاقم، لأنه كما قلنا: إن مشاكل اللاجئين الخاصة شيء والمشاكل التي واجهتهم في لبنان شيء آخر مختلف. الخلاصة التي يمكن الوصول إليها هي أن اللاجئ الفقير السوري هو الآن في عهدة الفقير اللبناني، الذي ربما كان نازحاً في فترة من الفترات أثناء العدوان الإسرائيلي أو في الحروب السابقة التي واجهها لبنان منذ الحرب الأهلية حتى الآن. إن الناس المحتاجين في لبنان هم من يساعدون السوريين المحتاجين وللأسف ليس هناك أحد يساعد الطرفين

الوضع Status: لقد ذكرت مبادرات المجتمع اللبناني المدني والسوري ومن بين هذه المبادرات هو الموقع الذي تشرف أنت عليه “إحقاق”، هل يمكن أن تشرح لنا كيف تكون الموقع وما هي أهدافه


خ: إن الهدف من وراء الموقع هو الحاجة للمساعدة لدليل كهذا أو لإرشادات وتوضيحات أو تسريبات، فأنت تحاول أن توصل المعلومة القانونية كي يعرف اللاجئ السوري حين يأتي إلى هنا ما المطلوب منه كضيف على دولة أجنبية أولاً وكلاجئ بصفة قانونية، وكلاجئ سوري هنا ما هي حقوقي وواجباتي، كي نكسر الصورة النمطية السائدة التي تروج لها الحكومة اللبنانية وهي أن اللاجئ السوري يحب أن يظل هكذا دون صفة قانونية لكن هذا غير صحيح. إن التسوية التي حاولت الحكومة اللبنانية القيام بها العام الماضي وسمحت بموجبها للاجئين السوريين الذين أوضاعهم غير قانونية أن يحاولوا إصلاح أوضاعهم القانونية، كان حجم إقبال اللاجئين في مراكز الأمن اللبناني كبيراً ومهولاً لدرجة أن مراكز الأمن العام لم تقدر على الاستيعاب، أي أن البنية التحتية للأمن العام اللبناني كانت عاجزة عن استيعاب أولئك اللاجئين الذين يريدون تسوية أوضاعهم القانونية وقوننة وجودهم في لبنان على عكس الصورة النمطية المعممة. بالتالي نحن نحاول أن نلعب دور الوسيط، من خلال الوصول إلى المعلومات لدى وزارة الداخلية وعن طريق المنظمات الأخرى ومراقبتنا على الأرض للحاجات التي يمكن أن يطلبها اللاجئون فيما يتعلق بالأوضاع القانونية، نحاول أن نحصل على هذه الأجوبة ونقدمها للناس بشكل مباشر أو عن طريق الموقع “أونلاين

 إن المجتمع الأهلي في سوريا ولبنان متجه نحو الإغاثة والإسعافات الطبية ومواضيع يعتبرونها حساسة ولكن الوضع القانوني وضع مؤسس لكل شيء يمكن أن تبنيه أنت لاحقاً، عملياً أن تستطيع أن تبني مدرسة ولكن استمرار هذه المدرسة وهذه الطبابة وهذه الإغاثة منوط دوماً بوضعك القانوني، لأن هناك من سيقول لك إن وضعك غير قانوني حين يتعلق الأمر بالإغاثة ويطلب منك أن ترتب وضعك القانوني كي تعمل. نحن نحاول ردم هذه الفجوة رغم أن هذا الجهد من المفترض أن تقوم به الدولة. والمشكلة الثانية هو أنه أنت كمنظمة مدنية سورية موجود هنا الآن غير معترف بك، إن القوانين اللبنانية كي تعترف بالجمعيات يجب أن يكون أربع أخماس المؤسسين لبنانيين كي تقدر على أن تفعل هذا، ونادراً ما تُمنح المنظمات السورية ترخيصاً إذا لم يكن هناك بين أعضائها أشخاص مزدوجو الجنسية، أي معهم جنسية لبنانية، وهذا غير متوفر لدى الجميع ولذلك تبقى المسائل محدودة

 ويقتضي الوضع القانوني أن يكون لديك حوار مع الحكومة ولكن هذا للأسف مفقود أيضاً، وهناك منظمات تبذل جهوداً منذ فترة طويلة ولكن كما قلنا بحسب طاقتها، وهذه طاقة محدودة جداً في مكان محدود جداً، وحجم التغيير محدود ولا يوجد تراكم. والمشكلة أن الجميع يعملون في نفس الحقل وفي نفس المكان مما يؤدي إلى مضاعفة الجهود حيث لا ضرورة لمضاعفتها، لذلك حين تعمل في مجال موضوع آخر فإن اللاجئين بحاجة إلى ذلك، إن الأمور نفسها تقوم بها  منظمات مختلفة على نحو مكرر وهذا لا يؤدي إلى تراكم خبرة أو تراكم مطالب لدى الحكومة اللبنانية قد يحدث بعد فترة ضغط من أجلها كي تُنفذ. وأيضاً نحن هنا في المجتمع المدني اللبناني كمنظمات سورية ورثنا الأمراض الموجودة في المجتمع المدني اللبناني، فلبنان أكثر البلدان العربية حباً بتأسيس المنظمات غير الحكومية، فهناك ثلاثة آلاف منظمة غير حكومية لبنانية لكن لا تأثير لها على الأرض، والأمر نفسه فيما يتعلق بالوضع السوري، فهناك الكثير من النوايا الحسنة، وهناك الكثير من الكلام المعسول والمساعدات في أمكنة محددة كما ذكرت لكن هذا كله لا يرقى إلى مستوى عمل جماعي كإنشاء شبكة أو تبادل الخبرات، وللأسف نحن عالقون بوحل العمل المدني اللبناني الذي يعتمد على البيانات، وللأسف هناك غياب للتنسيق ونشتغل كلنا على ردات الفعل. لا نريد أن نغبن حق أحد، فهناك أسماء كبيرة تعمل ولكن أمراضها هي أمراض لبنانية محلية وسنرى إن كنا سنقدر معاً على معالجة المشاكل المطروحة


الوضع Status: شكراً لك. بالطبع المشاكل كبيرة جداً ومعقدة. هناك أسئلة كثير أحب أن أطرحها عليك ونأمل أن يتم هذا في لقاء آخر في المستقبل.


April 5 2015


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2016-01-03

Syria “Training” Republic.. workshops on building a civil society in exile




The establishment of the first known civil association in Damascus dates back to 1880, and much water has passed under the bridge since then. The current Syrian authorities, upon taking power around four decades ago, quickly worked to empty Syrian civil society of any meaning and subject it to the long arm of the security bodies, or contain it by establishing affiliated institutions dressed up as civil groups, known as GNGOs. Meanwhile, the activities of more than 80 percent of authorized Syrian organizations and associations are restricted to charitable work (compared to 53 percent in Lebanon).

With the upswing in popular protests beginning in 2011, voluntary civil associations sprang into existence, trying diligently to bridge the gap generated by the government’s blockade of their work and the interruption in basic services. They were active in nursing, sanitation campaigns, relief, and media services. The activists quickly became a preferred target of the oppressive authorities, and were later targeted by the violations of extremists classified as anti-regime. Some estimates put the number of Syrian civil organizations at around 2,000, both inside the country and abroad, but they exhibit low levels of efficiency and expertise; they lack clear administrative organizational structures and also compete for resources.

Moreover, everyone continues to suffer as Syria’s nascent civil society moves from the era of government-imposed weakness to one of militarization, caused by the revolution. It has been a painful jump and the impact of the shock remains visible for everyone to see. This has required “training” activities, represented mainly by the many workshops that are announced, seemingly around the clock. These workshops are trying to compensate for the lack of expertise, develop individual skills and create new, institutionalized structures.

Lebanon is one of the countries that has hosted a large number of such training activities, especially as the UNHCR updates on a monthly basis the numbers of refugees registered with the agency (currently at 832,000), while independent or conflicting numbers, all taken together, put the total number at around 1.5 million people.

However, many questions are being asked today about the efficiency of these training activities and the strategies of the groups organizing them. This came in for particular criticism by Akram, one of the many Syrians who have taken part in a number of training workshops. “About the only benefit we get from the workshops we take part in is networking,” he says. “I meet other Syrians and we have been able to form relationships that later lead us to joint activities that have little to do with the goals of the training session that brought us together.” The 30-something Akram, who finished university studies and found himself in prison for anti-regime activities, doesn’t hide his annoyance with “the lack of any organizing strategy for these training activities.” “The working projects that were suggested turned into individual projects,” he says, concluding: “It seemed like there’s no need for these workshops, since no one is left in Syria.

The activists who do remain there are now unable to move around. Where were all these training activities during the first two years, when there was still room for civil work?” Jean Corse, a Lebanese trainer and the director of the International Center for Organization Development (ICOD), has a different opinion when it comes to the usefulness of training, although he agrees with Akram about the lack of strategy and coordination. “Yes, things are always changing in Syria,” Corse says. “But our response as a civil society organization should take this into account, and we should be dynamic. What we need to do, when we’re talking about transferring skills, is to undertake a contextual analysis upon which we build our  response. Our goal is to develop individual capacities so that these people can carry out this analysis, and not just offer direct assistance. Capacity building is a developmental goal, and not a purely relief-related activity.” As for the lack of coordination among training institutions.

  Corse acknowledges that when he used to work as an international relief coordinator, there was practically “no coordination,” before adding that “the poor coordination applies to other sectors when it comes to the situation in Syria.” “This is one of the problems that we’ve suffered from in other countries as well. There are sessions that are repeated, and no oversight. We’re nowhere near the required level of integration, or where we should be when it comes to reducing the gap between the reality and our objectives. If some parties exploit these sessions, we don’t recognize them, and most of the people we work with know this.” For Akram, another problematic issue lies in the readymade models that some rich countries try to pass off on Syrian trainers. He cites the example of distributing food parcels in some parts of Syria, containing large quantities of rice. It appeared that this was based on a training model taken literally from the international relief efforts after the tsunami of 2005.

Corse disagrees with this, saying, “We don’t want to work according to pre-conceived agendas or programs, whether from the west or the east.” “Even when it comes to benefiting from other lessons, such as the Lebanese case, for example, we should pay attention to the fact that the local context should have the highest priority” he says. “A change in the data requires us to change the nature of the response. We always need experts from the region and the only expert in Syria is the Syrian people. Naturally, Syrians should examine other experiences and form their own opinion. What we’re doing is empowering people from the country with the skills needed to perform the tasks, and not undertake these tasks on their behalf.”

Akram insists that spending an informal evening with friends who are serious about their work can take the place of a training workshop costing thousands of dollars in a Lebanese hotel. However, Corse states firmly that, based on his experience, the trainings do have long-term development dimensions, and that the objectives of institutions committed to this approach aren’t just about trying to bring Syrians to Lebanon. “But since we can’t be present in Syria, our focus is to train Syrian trainers who can carry out these humanitarian missions themselves in their own areas,” he says.

Published in Peace Building - UNDP

2015-04-28

علاء رشيدي.. اقتحام هادئ لكواليس الثورة




"اللعبة الأخيرة قبل فرض القواعد" مجموعة قصصية للكاتب السوري الشاب علاء رشيدي صدرت حديثاً عن دار "أطلس". 

مجموعة لا يبدو أنّ كاتبها كان مفتوناً لدى عمله عليها بإعادة اختراع عجلة الكتابة، أو حتى مجرد تجريب قوالبها الأكثر تداولاً. عوضاً عن ذلك يدخل رشيدي في نسق حكائي يترك له حرية انتقاء الزي السردي الذي يريد أن يظهر، أو يتنكّر، به.

هناك راو مراقب ورزين للحكاية، وهناك الشخصية التي تحكي قصتها بنفسها وكأنها لا تثق بأحد آخر لأداء هذه المهمة. حوارات مسهبة على الـ"سكايب"، ورسائل بريد إلكتروني، وربما فصول متوالية لقصة ممسرحة. قد يُستدرج القارئ إلى هيولى أحلام قلقة وهلوسات سائلة، ليجد نفسه في الصفحة التالية وهو يطالع فهرساً (حرفياً) لأحداث القصة اللاحقة وكأنه تبويب تقرير أكاديمي. والمحكية لغة للحكاية أيضاً إلى جانب الفصحى.

قوالب وتقنيات متعددة بتعدد شخوص الأحداث المروية التي يتورط الكاتب في توثيق مساراتها وأهوائها، أدبياً هذه المرة، إنّما من دون أن تفقد للحظة ارتباطها العضوي بما يُحكى، حقيقة، على الأرض السورية، وعنها. لنلج مع الكاتب بسلاسة أقبية الحراك الشعبي في البلاد، ونحلّق فوق أسطحه التي ستنهار "سلميّتها" في المستقبل الذي يبدأ مباشرةً بعد طي الغلاف الأخير للكتاب.

اقتحام هادئ لكواليس "الثورة" عبر ثماني قصص طويلة، يبدو وكأنّه يحدث اعتباطاً، دون قصدية مبيّتة، من خلال لغة وصفية متقنة، ترتكز على تفاصيل قد تكون متخيّلة تماماً في تتابعها وفضاءات حدوثها، غير أنّها تلمس في الذاكرة الجمعية المحلية خلايا حنينٍ ما زال غضّاً على مدى السنوات الثلاث الأخيرة.

يكتب رشيدي عن جثث بلا هويات تتوافد إلى منزل فرضت "قواعد اللعبة" على أهله أن يخصّصوا إحدى غرفه لتكون مشرحة مرتجلة، تستريح فيها الأجساد الهامدة ريثما يتم نقلها إلى غرفة أخرى تستحيل بدورها، بين عشية مظاهرة وضحاها، إلى ورشة "روتينية" لخياطة الأكفان، وبحضور ثلاثة أطفال يعتادون هذا الـ"ديكور" الطارئ الرهيب الذي لا يعرف البالغون إلى متى سيستمر.

وهنا لا يجد رشيدي حرجاً من تناول أُناس يستقبلون مصائرهم الجديدة كما يستقبلون بالخطأ مشروباً ساخناً لم يطلبوه من النادل الجديد:

"توقعنا في ذلك اليوم عدداً أكبر من الجثث المجهولة، وحضّرتُ في ذلك النهار ثلاثة أو أربعة أكفان. مساءً، حين لم يصلنا إلا الجثة رقم 15، لم نكن نعرف ما يجري حقيقة في المدينة" (حكاية فريق الموتى).

أمّا في "أسماء مستعارة للمغامرة، أسماء مستعارة للحنين" فتبدو جميع الشخصيات، التي تتفاعل مع بعضها بعضاً عبر البريد الإلكتروني، مربوطة بخيط استعادي، لا يشد إلى الوراء بقدر ما يستدعي قراءة أخرى لما كان ومضى، وكأننا بالكاتب يحاول أن يطلعنا على "مواهبنا" الاستشرافية التي التبست علينا دهراً، وفقدنا النسق المنطقي للاستدلال بها في حينه؛ أو لعله يضيء لقارئه الزمن "المضارع" الذي ليس في النهاية سوى البرزخ الذي تلتقي فيه لحظتا تحقّقِ النبوءة وانقضائها: 

"قامت الثورة وأنا شغّلت هالكاميرا، بس أُصبت بصدمة. لأنّو حتّى وقت بْصوّر وفاة شهيد عم يلفظ أنفاسو الأخيرة؛ ما بحس حالي عم صوّر شي جديد. بحس وكأنّو عم صوّر أشياء كنت إحلم فيها من زمان، من قبل ما يموت الشهيد".

يتقمّص رشيدي دواخل سكّان قصصه بحساسية "إجرائية" بالغة، وكأنه ينقل عن "موديل" واقف أمامه، أو هو مرّ منذ برهة وجيزة قربه؛ مثل ذلك التفصيل الدقيق المتمثل بإيراد أخطاء "زنجار" (أحد شخوص القصة السابقة) في الإملاء كما هي، وهي الصحفية السويدية التي تتخفّى وراء اسم مستعار، وتحاول كتابة رسائلها إلى أصدقائها السوريين في الداخل بالعربية التي ما زالت في طور تعلّمها.

بيد أنّ تقدير هذه الحساسية "اللغوية" بالذات، إلى جانب استخدام العامية في بعض النصوص، يشوّش عليها أحياناً وقوع الكاتب الشاب في بعض الهنات اللغوية، إملاءً ونحواً، في النصوص المعتمِدة على الفصحى، ما ينغّص إلى حد ما استمتاع القارئ وتركيزه على هذه الميزة بالذات، خاصة عندما يتمدد السرد، وتبدو الجمل بحاجة إلى من يضع لها نقطة على السطر.

على أنّ رشيدي لا يقف عند التوثيق الرومنطيقي لـ"ثورة" كان قد حسم أمر انحيازه لها باكراً في سطور نصوصه الأولى؛ بل يفصح بأمانة عن مطامح وتوقعات "ثوّاره" أنفسهم، ويأخذ حديثَ الانتفاضة السورية إلى مستويات يتم تجاهلها، سهواً أو عمداً، من قبل كتّاب آخرين في الحراك. إذ تصرّح مثلاً إحدى شخصياته بالقول: 

"إنّ ما يحدث في سوريا، وخصوصاً في باب النهر، ليس ثورة، إن لم تحرّر المثليين والمرأة. إن لم يتغير القانون الذي يعاقبهم على رغبات الجسد".

"اللعبة الأخيرة قبل فرض القواعد" (منحة "الصندوق العربي للثقافة والفنون"، 2012) مغامرة في الكتابة، ومغامرة في استكشاف دهاليز الحراك الشعبي المنفلت في البلاد، وبرهان جديد على أنّ "الإبداع" الفني المنبثق عنه، والذي بدأت بواكيره في الخروج إلى النور مؤخراً، يملك حساً نقدياً اجتماعياً عالياً، ومكاشفةً لا تكترث بالحسابات السياسية المبتذلة. 

وهو أمر يفتقر إليه دون شك "إبداع" الطرف الآخر، الذي سيبدو بالمقارنة محافظاً، مطموس الملامح بالمانشيتات، والخطابيات المائعة، ومتمترساً وراء لغة إعلانيّة لا تخاطب في الجسد سوى الأدرينالين، ولا في الروح سوى ثقبها العدمي الأسود.

ومن هنا يلتف الكاتب بمهارة على الإنشائيات الإخبارية والتحليلية ليضع القارئ على الكلمة التي كانت في البدء: "تهلّ الخفة على أعضائها كشلال، وتنسى الوجود، كأنّها تتحرر من ثقل الماضي. وفي الوقت ذاته، من قلق المصير في المستقبل. وفقط حين يغيب هذا المستقبل، تتوهم جمانة أنها قادرة على الطيران". (الضحية تنتصر بالبراءة).



2015-04-15

سمير الصايغ.. كلّما اتسع "الخط" ضاقت العبارة


نقف أمام لوحات سمير الصايغ الحروفية في "غاليري أجيال" البيروتي، ونشرع بطريقة آلية في ممارسة ما نعتقد أنه فعل ضروري لتذوقها، أي القراءة. إعجابنا بالشكل لا ينقذنا سريعاً من الوقوع في "فخ" ما أُسقط في وعينا عبر زمن مديد أنّه أساسي للاستمتاع بلوحة خط عربي. فلا مندوحة، بحسب تلك النظرية، عن فهم الكلمة المرسومة، أو إحالتها إلى مرجعيتها المقدسة، أو الشعرية، أو حتّى حكمتها المنطوقة، حيث النص سيد، والخط خادم.

ولمن قرر الاستكانة إلى هذه الخلاصة؛ لا بأس من أن يفوّت على نفسه فرصة الذهاب إلى معرض "ألِف بحروف كثيرة" (يستمر حتى 28 حزيران/ يونيو)، الذي إن كان يحاول شيئاً ما هنا، فهو ذلك العمل الدؤوب والمتواصل على تخليص هذا الحرف من تلك القراءة.
38 محاولة (عدد لوحات المعرض) لترسيخ طلاق قائم بين كلمات أضاعت معانيها لكثرة التداول والتكرار اللَغوي، وبين حروف باتت تلبسها تلك الكلمات كثياب مستعملة منذ أمد. في سبيل إتاحة فرصة للعين كي تلتقط شيئاً آخر غير المعنى، وتضيء في الوعي مساحات بصرية للتشكيل ردِمتْ بفعل الاستخدام النمطي للخط.

يقوم معرض سمير الصايغ (1945) في كثير من مرتكزاته المعرفية على مقولة إن الحرف العربي جاء لاحقاً على الصوت اللُغوي، ولم يأت في غاياته الأولى بقصد الإفهام والتبيين، بقدر ما كان فعلاً تزيينياً، وإنشاءً بصرياً محضاً، سعى للاحتفاء بالنص السماعي "المقدس" منذ أن خُطّت المصاحف الأولى. أي أنّ الحرف أضاف إلى النص الملفوظ، وجاء بكينونته التشكيلية المستقلة ليلتحم إرادياً بالمنطوق الشفاهي، ليجعل له أبعاداً ملموسة فخمة، ووعاء منظوراً، وفق رؤية تمجيدية فنية وجمالية.

فالسطر سطرٌ، لأنه مسطورٌ، لا لأنه مجرد مناخ لناقة اللغة السارحة. والجمع بين كتل الكلمات المرسومة، مبني على علاقة تتال، وتتابع، وانفكاك، بين وحدات "حروفية" تأتلف وتتكون بشكل حرّ، لا لضرورة أن تُكتب، أو تُقرأ.

إشكالية يعانِدُها كثيرون، حتى من بين أولئك الذين ألِفوا على نحو ما "خطّ" صايغ في العمل، والذي لا يريد للناظر أن يرى سطوحاً ملساء ببُعدين أو ثلاثة، كواجهة لنص. لكن مع مرورنا المرة تلو الأخرى أمام اللوحات، ومع بعض المران الروحي، تبدأ الحروف في فرض شخصيتها التجريدية على العين: "الفاء" تابوت مع شاهدة مستديرة محلّقة، وزاوية بيضاء، وليس في "النعش" والـ"تابوت" "فاء"، و"التاء" مربوطة بأضلع مرفوعة على أكتاف صندوق مذهب، وليس في الصندوق "تاء".

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الحرف، في عرف المحاضر في فنون العمارة والتصميم (الجامعة الأميركية في بيروت 1993-2007) فرس أصيلة بذاتها، لا مطيّة طيّعة، فحسب، للغة. يلوي خطامها الكاتب أو القارئ وفق ما يشتهيان. وعليه يأخذ الفنان على عاتقه مهمة إعادة الحصان إلى بريته الأولى، ويحتفي بغجريته المنفلتة من مهماز السائس الذي قصّ شعره، وقصّر رسنه، وأطال ركوبه.


والصايغ إذ يستعيد الالتماعة الأولى للحرف، وينفخ في جمرتها التي صار لها من العمر ألف عام؛ يحثنا من باب سرّي على معاودة اكتشاف القراءة ذاتها، عبر استنطاق الخط الطولي المستقيم، الألف، بأكثر مما قد تمنحه النظرة العارضة من انطباع المحدودية، أو الالتزام والتأطير. فالألف تنحني، ويلتوي خصرها، وتخرج من عموديتها، غير الشعرية، لتنحني معها القراءة، نحو أبعاد في المعنى ما زالت عذراء.

الخط ليس فعلاً مبسطاً للمباشرة، هدفه التيسير والشرح، بل هو كمون تجريدي في وحدته الأساس (النقطة المربعة) حيث تتبدى جذور مغامرة صايغ الحروفية أمامنا وهو يحدثنا عن مغامرة أكبر بدأت في ستينات القرن الآفل، مع "الحداثة" التي أراد رفعها وصحبه الأوائل (أدونيس، وأبي شقرا، والخال، والماغوط، وغيرهم) كبيرق، فإذا بها جلموداً مقدوداً من صوان، أردتها "ردّة" الحرب الأهلية، ورجعية أغلب من خاضها (من منطلقات "تقدمية") إلى قعر الوادي العربي المقفر.

فلم يتبق لنا سوى أنصاف الجمل: نصف مراجعة للتراث، ونصف استشراف للحداثة، ونصف أنسنة، ونصف مدنية، ولكن، اسبارطية كاملة. وما المزاج السياسي والثقافي "التعبوي" اليوم؛ سوى توأم متأخر عن شقيقه "الستيني"، مع انتفاضة غالبية "الشعب"، وخمود غالبية "النخبة".
إذ يرى الصايغ أنّ الكثرة الكاثرة من التجارب الفنية التي نادت بالعودة إلى "التراث"، كانت مجرد صدى للتطلعات السياسية وقتها، اتصالاً وانفصالاً في آن معاً: مع الهوية، وضد التبعية، مع التقدم، وضد الاستعمار. وما اقترحته الأحزاب من العشرينات إلى الأربعينات في السياسة، كان نفسه الذي تردَّد في الفن والثقافة عموماً.

إذ أنّ "النضال الحروفي" للناقد العتيق (في "مواقف"، و"لسان الحال"، و"فنون عربية"، وغيرها) لا يقف عند حدود لوحة الخط، بل يتجاوزها إلى الماورائي السياسي والأيديولجي الذي حرك لزمن طويل أقلام وريش "الخطاطين" الذين ساروا، بقصد أو عن غير قصد، في سيله الترويجي الجارف، والتي كانت إحدى موجاتها العارمة مكرسة على امتداد "رقعة" الإمبراطورية العثمانية، التي "نجحت" في تخريج "صُنّاع"، و"حرفيين"، أكثر مما خرّجت من "فنانين"، بما تنطوي عليه الكلمة من مضامين الإبداع، والإقدام، والخروج على الأطر المرسومة بمراسيم لم تشرع حينها سوى للانحطاط الثقافي في أواخر عهدها الزائل.

ولا يخفي صاحب "الفن الإسلامي: قراءة تأملية في خصائصه وفلسفته الجمالية" (1988)، و"الفن التشكيلي المعاصر في سوريا" (1998) تبرّمه من "أتقياء" التيار الحروفي الذين قنعوا من محيط الخط العربي باغتراف على السطح، وزهدوا في كنوزه التي لا ينالها إلا غواص صبور. فنادرون هم من اتصلوا بابن مقله، وياقوت، وابن البواب، وقره حصاري، والواسطي، وبهزاد. ومن فعل منهم ذلك، فتلمذة على يد كاندينسكي، وبول كليه، وماتيس، الذين قطعوا مسافات طويلة إلى دمشق ليتعلموا، فيما كانت الشام نفسها على مرمى ريش وأقلام أولئك الخطاطين العرب. ولهذا لم يكن غريباً أن يتحول الخط العربي، بسذاجة، من تعبير عن الهوية الحضارية إبان الاستقلال؛ إلى رمز أصولي باهت اليوم، بعد انقلاب الساسة، وتقلّب السياسة.

"المعلّم" الذي ابتعد عن اللوحة لزمن، يعود اليوم بديوان شعر كأنما أملي عليه (بعد "مقام القوس وأحوال السهم" 1980، و"مذكّرات الحروف" 2003)، وهو الشاعر الذي توقف عن الكتابة لنستعيده بيننا اليوم رساماً خطاطاً. ويحمل الديوان الجديد اسم المعرض نفسه "ألف بحروف كثيرة" (دار كاليغراف - بيروت).